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Are early retiree health benefits (RHBs) a form of deferred compensation that binds workers to an 
employer? Most employers who offer RHBs offer them only to workers who have 10 or more years of 
tenure with the firm and have reached age 55. Accordingly, workers in firms offering RHBs have an 
incentive to stay with a firm in the years before they attain eligibility for RHBs, and a greater incentive 
than otherwise to retire thereafter. We test for the existence of such a pattern of incentives by examining 
the age-specific relationship between workers’ eligibility for RHBs and retirement. The findings suggest 
that workers in RHB-offering firms are less likely to retire at ages 50 and 51 than similar workers in firms 
that do not offer RHBs. Also, RHB-eligible workers aged 60 and 61 are more likely to retire than similar 
RHB-ineligible workers. Such a pattern is consistent with RHBs acting as part of a delayed-payment 
contract of the kind described by Lazear (1979, 1981). 
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1. Introduction 
Retiree health benefits (RHBs) are of two kinds: those offered by employers to early 
retirees (former employees under age 65 who are not yet eligible for Medicare) and those offered 
to retirees aged 65 and older as a supplement to Medicare. Early RHBs—the first kind—have 
given rise to a range of policy issues and related research, including their influence on access to 
health care (Fronstin 2005), how they are to be funded, especially in the public sector (McNichol 
2008), and their influence on retirement (see below).  
In this paper, we investigate a set of related questions on RHBs that, to our knowledge, 
have not been addressed in the economic literature: Why do employers offer early RHBs? In 
particular, are early RHBs part of a compensation package that employers offer in order to attract 
and retain workers who are willing to make a long-term commitment to the firm? And does 
empirical evidence on the retirement patterns of RHB-offered workers tend to support or reject 
this “agency” theory of RHBs? Understanding why employers offer early RHBs is important 
because RHBs influence access to health care and retirement, and in addition because 
understanding employers’ motives for offering early RHBs can yield insights into the influence 
of workplace incentives on workers’ effort and labor supply behavior (Huck, Seltzer, and 
Wallace 2011).  
Our analysis proceeds in the following steps. Section 2 begins with institutional 
background on RHBs, a description of Edward Lazear’s (1979, 1981, 1983) theory of delayed 
payment contracts, and a discussion how that theory applies to firms’ RHB offers. Following a 
brief review of the existing literature on RHBs and retirement (section 3), we describe our 
approach to estimation (section 4). The basic model we specify is similar to other reduced-form 
models in the RHB-retirement literature, but in addition to a restricted model in which the 
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relationship between RHB offers and the probability of retirement is invariant to age and other 
individual characteristics, we specify a less restrictive model in which the estimated relationship 
between RHBs and retirement varies with workers’ demographic characteristics. 5 describes the 
data we use and details the variables used to specify the models.  
The empirical findings are described in section 6. Estimates from the restricted model are 
similar to previous findings in the literature and suggest that any worker with an RHB offer is 
about 3 percentage points (11 percent) more likely to retire than a worker without. But statistical 
tests reject the restricted model in favor of the unrestricted model, which suggests that workers 
aged 50–51 in RHB-offering firms are less likely to retire than similar workers in firms that do 
not offer RHBs. In contrast, workers aged 60–61 with RHB offers are more likely to retire than 
similar workers without RHB offers. This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that RHBs 
comprise part of a delayed-payment contract. It also suggests the importance of freeing up the 
functional form of the model so that the relationship between RHBs and retirement is allowed to 
differ by age.  
Section 7 illustrates the implications of the findings by simulating survivor functions of 
cohorts of workers offered (and not offered) RHBs. Simulations based on the preferred 
unrestricted specification suggest that, compared with a cohort of workers not offered RHBs, a 
cohort of RHB-offered workers contributes more person-years of employment before age 57, and 
fewer person-years of employment after age 57.  
 
2. Retiree Health Benefits as Part of a Delayed-Payment Contract 
Early RHBs are a nonwage benefit voluntarily provided by some employers to their 
employees. When available, they are offered to an employee who retires before age 65 (the age 
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of eligibility for Medicare) if that employee meets specified age and years-of-service (job tenure) 
requirements. As Table 1 shows, the age and service requirements in a sample of large 
employers vary substantially among employers and have changed over time. However, in 2003, 
more than 60 percent of the employers who offered early RHBs required an employee to be at 
least age 50 and to have at least 5 years of service with the firm. Many other RHB-offering 
employers (35 percent in 1996, and 18 percent in 2003) had more than one set of eligibility 
criteria—for example, an employer might offer early RHBs to any worker with 25 years of 
service (regardless of age), or to a worker aged 62 or older conditional on a minimum of 15 years 
of service. Accordingly, RHBs are a benefit offered to employees only after they have reached 
some minimum age and after they have accumulated some minimum years of service with the 
employer. 
Why would an employer offer such a benefit to employees? The generally accepted list of 
reasons for offering employee benefits includes favorable tax treatment of nonwage benefits 
under the corporation and personal income tax codes (Rice 1966); scale economies in the 
provision of benefits (Lester 1967); a belief by employers that consumption of certain goods will 
enhance production, which manifests itself as paternalistic provision of certain benefits such as 
health insurance (Rosen 2000); and the need of some firms to create a long-term bond between 
the worker and the firm (Lazear 1979).  
The third of these reasons—paternalism or “productive consumption”—cannot explain 
the provision of RHBs because, unlike regular employer-provided health insurance (EPHI), 
RHBs are received after a worker has retired from the firm. RHBs are subject to favorable tax 
treatment and scale economies, so these are both potentially valid explanations for RHBs. But 
RHBs have no special advantage over other employee benefits in either regard.  
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The last motive—the need to establish a worker-firm commitment or long-term bond—is 
also a potentially valid explanation for the existence of RHBs because in most cases a worker 
must have been with a firm for at least 5 years and have reached at least age 50 to be eligible for 
early RHBs. This delayed payment feature of RHBs distinguishes them from most other 
employee benefits. For example, the most widespread employee benefits—employer-provided 
health insurance and defined-contribution pension plans—are provided after (at most) a short 
time with the firm.  
In a series of seminar papers, Edward Lazear (1979, 1981, 1983) proposed an agency 
theory of delayed payment contracts. According to the theory, when firms find it difficult to 
monitor the effort and honesty of employees, they must develop a compensation scheme that 
discourages shirking and malfeasance. One such scheme is a delayed payment contract—a long-
term contract that shifts compensation to the end of a worker’s tenure with the firm. Employees 
who work hard and are honest earn the reward of high compensation late in their careers. Those 
who shirk or behave badly suffer the consequences of termination. Hence, by deferring 
compensation, the firm creates an incentive for employees to work hard and honestly.  
Figure 1 illustrates Lazear’s argument and alternative ways of implementing a delayed 
payment contract. V(t) is the worker’s value of marginal product (VMP) if he or she is paid a 
wage equal to VMP in each period. But to reduce shirking and malfeasance, the employer offers 
a contract such as W*(t), which pays less than the worker’s VMP early in the career (before t*), 
and more than the worker’s VMP later. Because this rising wage profile creates an incentive to 
work hard, the worker’s VMP in each period is V*(t)—higher than otherwise. Honest, productive 
workers will choose firms offering such a contract.  
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Lazear (1979, 1981) emphasizes three points about this delayed payment contract. First, 
T is the age at which retirement would optimally occur for this worker because at T, the 
reservation wage [shown by the rising R(t) function] equals the worker’s VMP [that is, R(T) = 
V*(T)]. Second, T is the age at which the present value of the “loans” made by the worker to the 
firm before t* equals the present value of the repayments made by the firm to the worker after t*. 
A worker who leaves the firm or is terminated before T will have contributed more to the firm 
than he or she receives in compensation, creating an incentive to be a solid employee so as to 
continue with the firm. Third, under the delayed payment contract, the wage paid at T exceeds 
the worker’s reservation wage [that is, W*(T) > R(T)], so the worker will not retire voluntarily at 
the optimal date. But T is implicitly the end of the delayed payment contract because at T, the 
firm has fully repaid the worker. Continuing to pay W*(t) would mean paying economic rents to 
the worker.  
If it could, the firm would mandate retirement at T. But mandatory retirement has been 
barred for most workers in the United States since 1986 under amendments to the Age 
Discrimination and Employment Act, so employers must fashion others ways of inducing 
workers to retire at the end of the delayed payment contract.1 One possibility is to offer a pension 
plan that an optimizing worker would choose to accept at T. Under a typical defined-benefit 
(DB) pension plan, a worker accepts a somewhat lower wage in exchange for the promise of a 
pension benefit that is determined by a formula (for example, years of service times some 
percentage of the average wage during the last three to five years of work). It is well-known that 
the present value of these plans rises to a maximum, usually around age 62, then drops as any 
increment to the annual benefit amount is outweighed by the shorter expected retirement 
                                                
1 The ADEA barred mandatory retirement before age 70 in 1978, then barred it completely in 1986 for all but bona 
fide executives and a few occupations such as firefighters, law enforcement officers, and air traffic controllers 
(Feder 2010). 
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duration implied by continuing to work for another year (Burkhauser and Quinn 1983a,b; 
Friedberg and Webb 2005).  
Figure 1 shows the effective wage profile for a worker with a typical DB pension plan as 
Wp(t), which lies below W*(t) (to reflect lower wage compensation during the working years in 
order to fund the pension) and falls after reaching a maximum at T (to reflect the loss of pension 
wealth from working beyond T). Further, the worker’s reservation wage can be expected to be 
discontinuous at T if the worker becomes eligible to receive pension benefits at that time—this is 
shown by Rp(t) in Figure 1. The combination of a falling effective wage [Wp(t)] and a discrete 
jump in the reservation wage [Rp(t)] leads the worker to retire at T—the optimal outcome and the 
outcome desired by the firm.  
Eligibility for early RHBs at T would enhance the jump in Rp(t) and further increase the 
incentive to retire. Accordingly, RHBs would seem to be a natural component of a delayed 
payment contract that ends earlier than age 65. They are uniquely adapted to the U.S. labor 
market, in which public health insurance benefits have not been available until age 65 (except for 
the poor and near-poor). For U.S. workers not covered by a spouse’s employer-provided health 
insurance, RHBs may be necessary to induce many workers to act on the retirement incentives in 
a DB pension plan and retire before age 65. In Lazear’s framework, RHBs are like DB pensions 
in that they are the manifestation of a long-term delayed payment contract.2 
Lazear’s theory implies that workers employed by firms offering delayed payment 
contracts will retire at or about age T. This suggests two testable implications with respect to 
RHBs and retirement. First, we should observe relatively low retirement probabilities for workers 
in RHB-offering firms in the years preceding RHB eligibility. The reason, of course, is that 
                                                
2 As DB pension plans have become more regulated in the last 30 years, employers have replaced them with defined 
contribution (DC) pension plans (Wolff 2011). Because DC plans do not create a financial incentive to retire at a 
particular age, this development has likely increased the importance of early RHBs as a retirement incentive. 
 6 
retiring before eligibility would mean giving up RHBs—the reward for hard work and honesty.3 
Second, we should observe relatively high retirement probabilities for workers in RHB-offering 
firms once they become RHB-eligible. Our goal is to test these two hypotheses. 
 
3. RHBs and Retirement: Previous Research 
Economists’ interest in early RHBs has focused mainly on the incentives they create to 
retire before age 65: workers with RHBs can retire before age 65 and retain their former 
employment-related health insurance at relatively low cost, whereas workers without RHBs who 
retire before age 65 must either pay for their former employer’s health benefits at cost or 
purchase private health insurance. Early estimates of the influence of RHB eligibility on 
retirement used data from the Retirement History Survey, conducted mainly during the 1970s 
(Gustman and Steinmeier 1994, Rust and Phelan 1997), the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (Karoly and Rogowski 1994, Madrian 1994), the Current Population Survey 
(Gruber and Madrian 1995), and the National Medical Expenditure Survey (Madrian 1994). With 
the notable exception of Gustman and Steinmeier (1994), these studies concluded that RHB 
availability (or “continuation coverage” in the case of Gruber and Madrian) significantly 
increases the probability that an older worker will retire. 
Hurd and McGarry (1993), Rogowski and Karoly (2000), Blau and Gilleskie (2001, 
2008), and Congdon-Hohman (2008) all estimate the influence of RHBs on retirement (or 
retirement expectations in the case of Hurd and McGarry) using data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), which we use below. Hurd and McGarry (1993) examine wave 1 
(1992) of the HRS and find that workers eligible for RHBs partly or fully paid by the employer 
                                                
3 Using pension offers, a similar implication has been tested by Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1993), who find that 
turnover is substantially lower in firms offering pensions than in firms that do not. 
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are significantly less likely than other workers to report that they expect to work past age 62. 
Rogowski and Karoly (2000) and Blau and Gilleskie (2001) each take advantage of two waves of 
the HRS and find that workers with an offer of RHBs are significantly more likely to retire than 
workers without. In particular, Rogowski and Karoly (2000) find that workers with RHBs in 
1992 were about 11 percentage points more likely to be retired in 1996 than those without. Blau 
and Gilleskie (2001) emphasize the importance of cost-sharing on the estimated relationship 
between RHBs and retirement. They examine retirement transitions during 1992–1994 and find 
that RHBs increased the probability of retirement by 6 percentage points if the employer paid the 
full RHB premium, but only by 2 percentage points if retirees had to contribute to the RHB’s 
cost. Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese (2003) also highlight the importance of RHB premium costs 
to the retirement decision, and Congdon-Hohman (2008) focuses on the health insurance of 
wives as a factor in husbands’ retirement decisions. 
Two papers (Marton and Woodbury 2010; Nyce et al. 2011) examine the influence of 
RHBs on retirement at particular ages, and both find that the relationship between RHBs and 
retirement is strongest for workers in their early 60s. Finally, Blau and Gilleskie (2008) estimate 
a dynamic structural model of retirement using the first four waves of the HRS (1992–1998, or 
three transitions). They find relatively small effects of RHBs on transitions out of employment: 
The exit rate from employment increases from 0.053 to 0.060 (0.7 percentage points, or less than 
12 percent) for men who gain RHB offers, and decreases from 0.091 to 0.069 (2.2 percentage 
points, or 24 percent) for men who lose them.  
Concerns about the endogeneity of RHBs have been raised frequently in this literature—
see especially Blau and Gilleskie (2008). If workers who want to retire early seek out firms that 
provide RHBs, an observed relationship between RHBs and retirement will reflect worker 
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heterogeneity rather than a causal effect of RHBs. For the questions we are investigating, the 
main point of interest is the partial correlation between the promise (or offer) of RHBs and the 
probability of retirement at each age, rather than the causal effect of RHBs on retirement. In the 
Lazear model, firms provide RHBs because they want to attract workers who are willing to make 
a long-term commitment to the firm and who know that malfeasance will lead to the loss of a 
desired benefit. If firms have this agency motive for offering RHBs, workers with RHB offers 
will inevitably differ in unobserved characteristics from workers without RHB offers. We should 
expect workers with RHB promises to have lower retirement probabilities at ages preceding the 
age of RHB eligibility, and higher retirement probabilities once they are eligible for RHBs. 
 
4. Approach to Estimation 
The HRS data we examine have information on six discrete two-year time intervals 
(seven interviews, each separated by about two years) starting in 1992, so a discrete-time hazard 
model of retirement is a natural approach to estimation. Specifically, we model the probability of 
worker i being retired at time t+1 (conditional on having been employed at time t) as a function 
of observables and unobservables at time t: 
Pr(retiredi,t+1 = 1 | •) = F[xit!  + !t + ci]      (1) 
where xit is a vector of person-specific characteristics capturing the observed heterogeneity in the 
sample (these may be either time-varying or time-constant), !t denotes transition-specific fixed 
effects (to account for economic and labor market conditions), and ci denotes unobserved 
worker-specific effects. We specify xit!  as follows: 
xit!  = !1(rhbit) + !2(pensionit) + !3(wealthit) + !4(ageit) + !5(demogit) + !6(healthit) 
+ !7(spouseit) + !8(jobcharit)        (2) 
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where rhbit denotes a set of indicators modeling whether worker i had employer-provided health 
insurance (EPHI) and an RHB offer in year t, pensionit and wealthit are sets of indicators of the 
pension and nonpension wealth of worker i in year t, ageit is a set of age indicators, demogit 
denotes variables indicating race and level of education, healthit is a set of health indicators, 
spouseit is a set of dummies indicating whether worker i was married in year t and whether his 
spouse was working, and jobcharit is a set of job characteristic indicators. The rationale for 
including these variables in models of retirement behavior is well established in the literature—
see for example Ruhm (1990a) and Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990)—although different 
retirement models specify these variables in different ways. In particular, the specification of 
pension wealth in models of retirement has been an active field of research during the past 25 
years—see Coile and Gruber (2007), Friedberg and Webb (2005), and Gustman and Steinmeier 
(2001/2002) for insightful guides. We return to these points below. 
Equation (2) follows the existing literature in restricting the relationship between an RHB 
offer and retirement to be the same for all workers—that is, !1 is a “main effect” that does not 
vary over workers. This assumption is clearly unappealing in light of the central hypothesis we 
are testing—that the relationship between RHBs and retirement varies with age. We also want to 
ensure that an estimated relationship between RHB offers and age is not picking up some 
alternative characteristic-specific influence of RHBs, so it makes sense to specify the model 
flexibly and allow the relationship between RHBs and retirement to vary with age, other 
observables, and over time. Accordingly, we respecify equation (2) by fully interacting rhbit with 
other explanatory variables and !t (the transition indicators): 
xit! = !1(rhbit) + !2(pensionit)(rhbit) + !3(wealthit)(rhbit) + !4(ageit)(rhbit)  
+ !5(demogit)(rhbit) + !6(healthit)(rhbit) + !7(spouseit)(rhbit) + !8(jobcharit)(rhbit)  
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+ !t (rhbit)          (3) 
In equation (3), (ageit)(rhbit) denotes age indicators by themselves and age indicators fully 
interacted with the health insurance-RHB indicators (with !4 the vector of coefficients on these 
indicators), and similarly for the other terms in the equation. Retrieving subgroup estimates from 
this fully interacted model is straightforward: After substituting equation (3) into equation (1), 
we differentiate with respect to rhb and evaluate the derivative for a given subgroup at the 
sample mean (that is, substituting sample mean characteristics for variables other than those in 
the given subgroup). 
A convenient choice for the function F in equation (1) is the standard normal cumulative 
density, which allows estimation of the model as a pooled probit. Equation (1) is an unobserved-
effects model for panel data, so if the individual fixed effects ci are correlated with the 
observable characteristics xit, the estimates of !  (!1 in particular) cannot be interpreted as causal 
effects of x on the conditional probability of retirement (because individual fixed effects are 
omitted). However, because the Lazear model presumes the existence of unobserved 
heterogeneity (indeed, incentives like RHB offers would be unnecessary if firms could observe 
all relevant worker characteristics), this does not prevent testing Lazear’s agency hypothesis. 
Also note that pooled probit combines the individual fixed effects ci and the idiosyncratic error 
uit into a single composite error, vit, which will be serially correlated. This latter issue can be 
resolved by imposing structure on vit and applying a random effects estimator, which is the 




5. Data and Variable Specification 
We estimate equation (1) using a sample of men born between 1931 and 1941 from the 
HRS.4 The analysis below is restricted to men who were working full-time (" 35 hours per week) 
at the time of the first survey in 1992. Available HRS data allow us to follow these men through 
six transitions: 1992–1994, 1994–1996, 1996–1998, 1998–2000, 2000–2002, and 2002–2004.  
Figure 2 summarizes the behavior of the men in the main HRS sample over the 12 years 
we observe them. The sample starts in 1992 with 3,150 men aged 51–61 who were employed 
full-time. Between 1992 and 1994, 303 left the study due to attrition (death or other reason), so 
we consider 2,847 men to have been “at risk” of retirement during the 1994–1996 transition. Of 
these, 225 (8 percent) reported themselves as “retired” in the 1994 interview, and another 309 
reported themselves in one of five “other” labor force statuses—part-time work, unemployment, 
partial retirement, disability, or not in the labor force (the “other” category in Figure 2).5 Of the 
2,313 employed full-time men still in the sample in 1994, 181 men left the sample through 
attrition by 1996, so 2,132 men remained “at risk” of retirement. Of these, 226 (11 percent) 
reported they had retired by 1996, and 235 reported moving to the “other” category. The 
remainder of the figure follows in the same way between each two-year time period. Ultimately, 
of the 3,150 men, 1,060 reported they had retired by 2004, 766 were lost to the study due to 
attrition, 997 reported moving to the “other” category, and 327 continued full-time employment 
during the entire 12 years. Note that we treat departure from full-time employment as an 
absorbing state—once a worker leaves full-time employment, he is lost to further full-time work 
and another “retirement event.” As Ruhm (1990b, 1995) and Maestas (2010) have shown, this is 
                                                
4 See Institute for Social Research (n.d.). For the empirical analysis, we started with the RAND HRS Data file, 
Version F, which is a simplified longitudinal data set based on the HRS data (St. Clair et al. 2006).  
5 Note that these “other” workers did not report themselves as retired. 
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not entirely realistic, but it is a simplification that makes sense if the model describing the 
original decision to retire differs from that describing subsequent retirement decisions. 
Figure 2 suggests two alternative ways of defining retirement—one “narrow” and one 
“broad.” The narrow definition classifies an individual as retired only if he reports himself as 
such; the broad definition classifies him as retired if he reports himself as retired or occupies one 
of the “other” categories (all of which imply that he is no longer employed full-time). In a highly 
useful discussion of how to define retirement in the HRS, Gustman and Steinmeier (2001/2002) 
refer to the narrow measure as “subjective” (because it is based solely on a self-assessment) and 
to the broad measure as a “hybrid” (because it combines a self-assessment with reported labor 
force status). Gustman and Steinmeier’s analysis suggests that hybrid measures of retirement 
(like the broad measure) ameliorate deficiencies of using either self-reports or measures of labor 
force status alone. For our purposes especially, the broad measure makes sense because we want 
to know when a worker leaves a “career” job, an event that would trigger RHB receipt. In the 
empirical work below, we report estimates based on both the narrow and broad definitions, but 
we emphasize estimates based on the latter. 
The HRS survey allows us to specify xit using a rich set of explanatory variables, 
displayed in Table 2. The first column of Table 2 shows sample percentages for each variable, 
calculated from the 9,657 two-year transitions observed in the HRS sample of 3,150 men who 
were working full-time in 1992. The second column shows sample percentages calculated from 
the 1992 (wave 1) observations of these 3,150 men. The third column shows sample percentages 
calculated from the 1992 observations of the 2,057 men who retired (broad definition) during 
one of the six transitions we analyze. 
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We model whether worker i’s employer offered RHBs in year t (rhbit) using a set of 
mutually exclusive dummy variables for the following four states: 6 
• the worker had EPHI but no offer of RHBs (the reference category) 
• the worker had EPHI and either worked for an employer who offered RHBs or would 
receive health benefits if he retired (see the discussion below) 
• the worker had no EPHI but was covered by some other type of health insurance  
• the worker had no health insurance coverage  
Fronstin (2005, Figure 16) found that 57 percent of men aged 45–64 reported being eligible for 
early RHBs in 1996.7 As shown in Table 2, a similar percentage of men (56 percent) had 
employers who offered RHBs in wave 1 (1992) of the HRS sample we analyze. However, the 
RHB questions in the first two waves (1992 and 1994) of the HRS differ from those in later 
waves. In waves 1 and 2, the HRS survey asked whether the EPHI that currently covers a worker 
is “available to people who retire” and whether the employer has “any health insurance plan 
available to retirees.” These questions are well suited to detecting the presence of a delayed 
payment contract because they do not ask whether a worker’s EPHI would cover him if he 
retired now, but rather indicate whether the employer offers RHBs. In the 1996 wave and later 
(1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004) the survey asks two questions, both pertaining to whether a worker 
could continue his current EPHI “up to the age of 65.”8 These questions are more specific to the 
worker’s current eligibility for RHBs.9  
                                                
6 Missing values for the RHB variable have been a concern associated with using the HRS; however, once we 
impose our sample restrictions to focus on men who were working full-time at the time of the first survey in 1992, 
we have a yes or no response for the RHB variable for all observations. 
7 Fronstin’s estimate is based on the 1997 Survey of Income and Program Participation. 
8 The first question is, “Can you continue [EPHI] for yourself up to the age of 65?” The second is, “If you left your 
current employer now, could you continue [EPHI] coverage for yourself up to the age of 65?”  
9 The RAND documentation points out that the 1996 and later questions could be interpreted in various ways. For 
example, a respondent could answer “yes” at age 63 1/2, thinking that he or she could continue his EPHI through 
age 65 under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, even though there would be no employer 
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To address concerns about the RHB questions and the change that occurred after the 1994 
wave, we estimated the models separately for the first two transitions (1992–1994 and 1994–
1996) and again for the last four transitions (1996–1998, 1998–2000, 2000–2002, and 2002–
2004). Surprisingly, perhaps, the two sets of estimates (not reported) are quite similar. We would 
speculate that two factors—the aging of the sample and interacting the RHB variable with age—
minimize the effect of the change in the RHB questions and the way they might be interpreted. It 
also seems possible that, although the RHB questions changed in wave 3, respondents continued 
to interpret them to have their original meaning from waves 1 and 2.  
The model includes two sets of indicators modeling the type and amount of pension 
wealth held by worker i in year t (pensionit). The first models the asset value of any defined 
benefit (DB) pension the worker expected to receive using four indicators:10  
• not included in a DB plan, hence no DB pension wealth (the reference category)  
• positive DB pension wealth up to $100,000  
• DB pension wealth of $100,000 to $200,000  
• DB pension wealth greater than $200,000  
Table 2 shows that just over two-fifths of the sample (42 percent) had positive DB pension 
wealth in 1992 (wave 1).11 
                                                                                                                                                       
contribution. Alternatively, the respondent could respond “yes” to the first question, thinking he or she will continue 
to be employed, and so will continue to be covered (even if the employer did not offer retiree health benefits). 
10 Specifically, the HRS collected employer contact information in 1992 and 1998, then obtained information on DB 
pension plans directly from employers when possible (Health and Retirement Study 2006, pp. 3–5). From these data, 
the HRS calculated or imputed several values of each worker’s DB pension plan for 1992 and 1998. We use “DB 
value at expected retirement age prorated and discounted” to 1992 or 1998, which approximates the present value of 
expected future plan benefits, based on the worker’s work to date and self-reported expected retirement age. The 
amount is intended to be comparable to a defined contribution (DC) pension accumulation, which is why we use it. 
11 This specification of DB pension incentives for retirement is similar to that used in early research on pensions and 
retirement (see the review by Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers 1990). Important papers by Lazear and Moore (1988) 
and Stock and Wise (1990) noted that optimal retirement decisions require workers to be forward-looking and 
consider the “option value” of continued work, and empirical work has implemented this idea in various ways 
(Samwick 1998, Gustman and Steinmeier 2001/2002, Friedberg and Webb 2005, Coile and Gruber 2007). Using DB 
pension wealth levels, rather than a more complicated construct, could represent a misspecification that could lead to 
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A second set of pension wealth indicators model the current accumulation (if any) in 
defined contribution (DC) pension accounts held by the worker: not included in any DC plan (the 
reference category); positive DC accumulation up to $100,000; DC accumulation of $100,000 to 
$200,000; and DC accumulation greater than $200,000. Table 2 shows that, in the first year they 
were surveyed, just over one-third of the sample had a DC plan; however, only 5.6 percent had 
DC accumulations greater than $100,000.12 
We also include two sets of conventional wealth indicators (Farnham and Sevak 2007). 
The first captures worker i’s housing wealth at each interview, defined as the net value of the 
primary residence.13 The second set of wealth indicators gives the value of worker i’s non-
housing wealth at each interview, defined as the sum of financial wealth (stocks, checking 
accounts, CDs, bonds, and other financial assets) plus the value of real estate other than primary 
and secondary residences, vehicles, and businesses.14 For both housing and non-housing wealth, 
we construct sets of dummy variables with the same categories as those used for DB and DC 
pension wealth. Table 2 shows that in the first year they were interviewed, 62 percent of the 
sample had positive housing wealth up to $100,000, and 62 percent had positive non-housing 
wealth up to $100,000. 
The demographic controls included in the model (demogit) are age in year t (an indicator 
for each age from 50 to 64, and an indicator for 65 and older), an indicator equal to 1 for 
                                                                                                                                                       
overstatement of size of the relationship between RHBs and retirement. For example, many DB pension plans create 
incentives for a worker to retire shortly after reaching the plan’s early retirement age or at plan’s normal retirement 
age (Kotlikoff and Wise 1989, Samwick 1998). However, Lazear’s theory of delayed payment contracts leads to the 
expectation that retirement incentives from a DB pension plan and the timing of eligibility for RHBs are correlated 
by design, in which case DB pension incentives and RHB eligibility would be collinear.  
12 DC pension accumulations were reported by workers in every wave, unlike information on DB pensions, so they 
can vary fully over time. 
13 The net value of any secondary residence is available only starting in 1998. Accordingly, the estimates leave out 
any consideration of the value of a secondary residence. 
14 Note that this variable includes IRAs and Keoghs, which are nominally forms of retirement wealth; however, 
because many households draw on these assets before retirement (even though they suffer a tax penalty), treating 
them as nonretirement wealth is reasonable. 
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nonwhites, and four schooling indicators (less than high school, high school graduate only, some 
college, and college graduate or more).15 
To capture worker i’s health status in year t (healthit), we include three sets of indicators. 
The first models the worker’s body mass index (BMI, weight in kilograms divided by height in 
meters squared) in year t: BMI < 18.5 (underweight); 18.5 # BMI < 25 (normal weight); 25 # 
BMI < 30 (overweight); and BMI " 30 (obese). Table 2 shows that 70 percent of the workers in 
the sample were overweight or obese by this measure in the first year of the HRS. The second is 
a dummy equal to 1 for workers who report having two or more chronic health conditions in year 
t—high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, chronic lung disease, heart disease, stroke, or arthritis. 
This is only a rough indicator of a respondent’s health, in part because it does not distinguish 
between more and less serious conditions. Accordingly, we also include a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for respondents who report being in fair or poor health in year t. 
Because the labor force status of a spouse is likely to be important to an individual’s 
decision to retire, we include a set of mutually exclusive dummies capturing the marital status of 
each man and the employment status of his wife in year t: not married (the reference category), 
married to a woman working full-time, married to a woman working part-time, and married to a 
woman who did not work (unemployed, retired, disabled, or not in the labor force). Couples’ 
labor supply decisions are likely to be made jointly, and the above set of indicators may be 
endogenous, although few papers on health insurance and labor supply have addressed the issue 
(but see Blau and Gilleskie 2006, Kapur and Rogowski 2007, and Congdon-Hohman 2008). We 
have checked the sensitivity of the main estimates to inclusion or exclusion of these variables 
and find that the results are essentially unchanged. 
                                                
15 Brown (2006) has found that workers tend to retire at the age they regard as “usual” for workers of their type; 
however, we have not taken advantage of the “usual retirement age” question that is asked of RHS respondents.  
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Finally, we include indicators of two aspects of each worker’s job in year t: whether he is 
in a blue-collar occupation and whether he is self-employed. Blue-collar work tends to be 
physically taxing, and we expect it to be related to earlier retirement. Self-employed workers 
tend to have a taste for work, and we expect them to be less likely than others to retire. Also, as 
shown in Table 1, RHBs are generally available only to workers with substantial job tenure, so 
we also include a set of job tenure indicators. 
Comparison of columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 shows how those who retired (broad 
definition) from the HRS sample during the years we observe them differed from the full HRS 
sample. Retirees were more likely to have an offer of RHBs, positive pension balances, and job 
tenure exceeding 25 years at wave 1. Further descriptive tabulations based on the first wave of 
the sample offer preliminary insight into the possible role of RHBs as part of a delayed payment 
contract. Table 3 shows the mean years of job tenure for workers at the beginning of the panel 
(1992) by age and whether they were offered RHBs at that time. Two findings seem relevant. 
First, the age-tenure profile for RHB-offered workers rises and plateaus at age 57, whereas the 
age-tenure profile for workers not offered RHBs doesn’t peak until ages 61–62. This is 
consistent with RHB-offered workers retiring earlier. Second, workers in their early 50s with 
RHB offers have substantially more job tenure than those without RHB offers, which suggests 
the RHB-offered workers may be working under a delayed payment contract. 
!
6. Empirical Findings 
Table 4 displays results derived from estimating equation (1) in which the relationship 
between RHBs and retirement is restricted to be the same for all workers in the HRS sample 
described above—that is, xit! is specified as in equation (2). In panels 1, 3, and 4, the dependent 
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variable is transition to broad-definition retirement; in panel 2 narrow-definition retirement is 
used. To check the sensitivity of the estimates to inclusion of self-employed workers, the panel 3 
estimates use a sample from which workers who were self-employed at wave 1 have been 
dropped. To check the sensitivity of the estimates to inclusion of workers older than 64, the panel 
4 estimates use a sample from which workers are dropped when they reach age 65. 
Each dy/dx in Table 4 is the estimated average change in the two-year retirement 
probability associated with the specified characteristic, based on coefficients estimated by 
random-effects probit. The dy/dx of main interest pertains to “employer-provided and RHB.” In 
all four cases, the point estimate is close to 0.03 (with p-value = 0.01 or less), which suggests 
that workers with RHB offers were about 3 percentage points more likely to retire over a two-
year period than otherwise similar workers who had EPHI but no RHB offer (the reference 
group). The mean two-year retirement probability for these workers was 11 percent, so the 
estimated increase in retirement probability (3 percentage points) implies that RHB-offered 
workers were more likely to retire than those without by about 27 percent. This is similar to 
estimates obtained by Rogowski and Karoly (2000) and Blau and Gilleskie (2001), who used 
early waves of the HRS. 
The proposed test of whether RHBs are part of a delayed payment contract amounts to 
testing whether and how the relationship between RHBs and retirement varies with age. To 
address these questions, we turn to the unrestricted specification of equation (1). Table 5 displays 
selected subgroup estimates from applying random-effects probit to equation (1), with xit! 
specified as in equation (3).16 For each subgroup, figures in the dy/dx column give the estimated 
                                                
16 Because comparison of panels 1, 3, and 4 in Table 4 show that the estimates are not sensitive to dropping self-
employed workers or those older than 64, the estimates in Table 5 are based on the full sample only. 
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average difference between the retirement probability of workers with an RHB offer and the 
retirement probability of workers in the same subgroup that had EPHI but no RHBs.17 
To begin, we note that a chi-square tests for equality of the relationship between RHBs 
and retirement for various subgroups (not displayed) rejects equality in three cases: among age 
groups, among job tenure categories, and across two-year transitions. 
The main findings in Table 5 pertain to the relationship between RHB offers and 
retirement probabilities at different ages. Under the broad definition of retirement (panel 1), the 
estimates suggest that workers aged 50–51 with RHB offers are less likely to retire by about 8.7 
percentage points, compared with workers aged 50–51 without RHB offers. The point estimates 
for workers aged 52 and 53 are also negative, but they are smaller and imprecise. At age 54, the 
estimates suggest that workers with RHB offers are about 4 percentage points more likely to 
retire than those without. Although the relationship is only marginally significant (p-value = 
0.11), the two-year transition for workers aged 54 brackets the fifty-fifth birthday, which is when 
many workers first become eligible to receive RHBs, so the estimate seems reasonable. From 
ages 55 to 59, the point estimates are positive but generally small and statistically insignificant. 
At ages 60 and 61, however, the relationship between an RHB offer and retirement is clearly 
positive and statistically significant: For these workers, an RHB offer is associated with an 
increase in retirement probability of 5.8 to 7.0 percentage points. For workers aged 62–64, there 
again appears to be no significant relationship between RHB offers and retirement.18 
                                                
17 Section IV describes computation of the subgroup estimates. Subgroup estimates for pension wealth, housing 
wealth, and non-housing wealth subgroups are statistically insignificant at conventional levels, so we do not report 
them. 
18 Under the narrow definition of retirement, the point estimates are similar in sign, but usually smaller in absolute 
value. The negative point estimates for workers in their early 50s are not significant, and the point estimates for 
workers at ages 60 and 61, although statistically significant, are less than 0.02. Under narrow-definition retirement, 
the largest positive estimates occur for workers at ages 53 and 55, consistent with workers gaining RHB-eligibility 
at age 55. 
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We interpret these estimates as generally consistent with RHBs being part of a Lazear-
type delayed payment contract, as described in section 2. Most workers in firms offering RHBs 
are not eligible to receive RHBs until they reach age 55, so it stands to reason that workers in 
their early 50s in firms offering RHBs would avoid retirement. This is what we observe. Further, 
as Table 1 shows, RHB offers often become effective at ages 55 and 60, so the finding that the 
relationship between RHB offers and retirement probabilities is positive at or about these ages 
again stands to reason.  
The estimates also suggest that the relationship between retirement and RHBs is stronger 
for workers with long job tenure (more than 15 years) than those with short job tenure (15 or 
fewer years).19 This again seems consistent with Table 1, which shows that workers need 
substantial tenure before they are eligible to receive RHBs. The finding is also consistent with 
the idea that RHBs are part of a delayed payment contract.  
Finally, the estimates in Table 5 suggest that workers with RHB offers were more likely 
to retire during the 2000–2002 transition than during other periods. During 2000–2002 the labor 
market was slack,20 and a stronger relationship between RHBs and retirement during a recession 
would be consistent with Coile and Levine’s (2007) evidence that retirements tend to increase 
during economic downturns for workers who are eligible for Social Security.21 
 
  
                                                
19 The estimate for < 1 year of tenure is also positive, which would be consistent with RHB-offering employers 
being more selective and weeding out less productive workers during a probationary period. 
20 During 2000–2002, payroll employment fell by about 1 percent, and the unemployment rate increased from 4.0 to 
5.8 percent. 
21 The estimate for the 1994–1996 transition is also positive and statistically significant, and the labor market was 
robust during that period, so the same explanation does not hold. Although the finding only shows up when the 
broad definition of retirement is used, it is a puzzling estimate. 
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7. Implications for Retirement Patterns 
To fully interpret the above estimates, we simulate survivor functions based on them—
see Table 6 and Figure 3. Each simulation starts with 1,000 full-time workers at age 50 with a 
given set of characteristics.22 We calculate the conditional probability (or hazard) of retirement at 
each age, and apply the retirement hazard for age t to the workers still working full time at that 
age (the risk set). The resulting survivor function shows the number of men who remain working 
full time at each age. 
For each set of estimates, we simulate two survivor functions—one for a cohort without 
RHB offers (the “No RHBs” columns), and a second for a cohort with them (the “RHBs” 
columns). The number of retirements associated with RHB offers at age t (Rt) is obtained as the 
difference between the number of retirements of RHB-offered workers at age t and the number 
of retirements of not-RHB-offered workers at the same age. 
The survivor functions in panels 1 and 3 of Table 6 restrict the relationship between 
RHBs and the probability of retirement to be the same at all ages—that is, RHB-offered workers 
are about 3 percentage points more likely to retire at any age. Accordingly, in these simulations, 
the number of workers surviving at each age in the “RHB” columns is necessarily less than in the 
“No RHB” columns.23 The plots on the left of Figure 3 illustrate this for the simulations in panel 
1 of Table 6 (which uses the broad definition of retirement).  
                                                
22 Specifically, we simulate the survivor function for a worker with the modal characteristic within each set of 
indicators: DB pension wealth, DC pension accumulation, housing wealth, and non-housing wealth all between $1 
and $100,000; white; high school education; BMI between 25 and 30 (overweight); fewer than two chronic health 
conditions; in good or better self-reported health; married to a spouse who works full time; has more than 25 years 
of job tenure; is not self-employed; and is not blue collar. 
23 Note that the number of retirements associated with RHBs becomes negative at age 63 for the restricted estimates 
in panel 1 because by age 63 the risk set for the RHB-offered cohort becomes small enough that it generates fewer 
retirements than the “No RHB” cohort, even though the RHB-offered cohort has the higher retirement hazard. 
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In contrast, the survivor functions based on the unrestricted estimates (panels 2 and 4) 
allow the relationship between RHBs and retirement to vary with age. As a result, the RHB-
offered cohorts are larger than the “No-RHB” cohorts when men are in their early 50s, and 
become smaller only at age 58 (under the broad definition of retirement) or age 55 (under the 
narrow definition). The plots on the right of Figure 3 illustrate this for the simulations in panel 2 
of Table 6 (using broad definition retirement), Here, the RHB-offered workers’ survivor function 
is tilted relative to that of the “No RHB” workers, so the age distribution of a cohort of RHB-
offered employees differs from that of workers not offered RHBs. With RHBs, more workers 
employed in their early 50s (when likely more productive) and substantially fewer employed in 
their 60s (when they may be less so). The pattern reflects the implicit contractual nature of RHBs 
and the incentive they give workers to stay with an employer long enough to complete the 
delayed payment contract, but not longer. 
 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
We have used data from the main cohort of the HRS to test the hypothesis that RHBs are 
part of a delayed payment contract offered by employers who want to attract and retain 
productive workers over the long term. This “agency” motive for offering RHBs is suggested by 
Lazear’s (1979, 1981) model, which shows that offering a delayed payment contract creates 
incentives that reduce employee malfeasance and increase productivity. Our empirical approach 
extends past work on RHBs by specifying an unrestricted model that allows the effect of RHBs 
to differ among different subgroups of workers—in particular, among workers of different ages. 
The findings suggest that, at ages 50 and 51, workers in firms offering RHBs are about 8.5 
percentage points less likely to retire than workers in firms not offering RHBs. This is consistent 
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with RHB-offered workers acting on a delayed payment incentive to remain with the firm until 
they become eligible to receive RHBs. In contrast, RHB-offered workers in their mid 50s and at 
ages 60 and 61 are more likely to retire than their counterparts who are not offered RHBs. This is 
consistent with RHB-offered workers terminating their delayed payment contract at the time 
specified by the employer via the timing of eligibility for RHBs. Overall, the retirement pattern 
of men who were offered RHBs in this sample appears consistent with RHBs acting as part of 
the Lazear-type delayed payment contract. 
The empirical survivor functions reported in section 7 clarify the implications of these 
findings and highlight the importance of allowing the relationship between the probability of 
retirement and RHBs to vary by age. Survivor functions based on restricted estimates, which 
force that relationship to be equal for all workers aged 50–65 (and which we reject), suggest that 
a cohort of RHB-offered workers will shrink monotonically starting at age 50 relative to a cohort 
of workers who are not offered RHBs. In contrast, survivor functions based on unrestricted 
estimates, in which the relationship between RHB offers and retirement can vary with age, 
suggest that a cohort of RHB-offered workers will be larger than a cohort not offered RHBs until 
workers are in their mid to late 50s. This occurs because workers in firms offering RHBs have an 
incentive to stay with the firm through the end of the delayed payment contract, which implies 
not retiring until (typically) age 55 or 60. The findings, then, suggest the importance of 
understanding firms’ motives for offering RHBs in the first place—to reduce malfeasance and 
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Age 55 + 20 years of service
Age 60 + 10 years of service
Based on age/service points
Age 55 + 15 years of service
Table 1
Eligibility Requirements for Early Retiree Health Benefits, 
Employers with 1,000 or More Employees, 1996 and 2003
(percentage of employers)
Requirements
Age 50 + 15 years of service
Age 50 + 10 years of service
Age 55 + 5 years of service
Age 55 + 10 years of service
Based on age and/or service plus age/service points
Two or more alternatives
Other (e.g., age only or service only)
Source: Fronstin (2005), based on data from Hewitt Associates.
Column sum






definition):   
wave 1 values
(1) (2) (3)
Number of men 3,150 3,150 2,057
Number of two-year transitions 9,657 n/a n/a
Health insurance coverage
employer-provided but no RHBs (reference) 30.8 24.2 22.7
employer-provided and RHBs 51.6 56.1 59.4
non-employer 8.3 7.8 7.2
none 9.4 11.9 10.7
Defined Benefit pension wealth ($)  
0 (reference) 58.8 57.6 54.7
1–100,000 23.0 23.9 24.6
100,001–200,000 8.9 9.2 10.2
> 200,000 9.3 9.2 10.5
Defined Contribution pension accumulation ($)  
0 (reference) 64.7 64.7 62.6
1–100,000 28.0 29.7 31.4
100,001–200,000 3.5 3.2 3.5
> 200,000 3.8 2.4 2.5
Housing wealth ($)  
< 1 (reference) 15.8 18.3 15.8
1–100,000 59.5 62.2 64.9
100,001–200,000 18.0 14.9 15.1
> 200,000 6.7 4.6 4.3
Non-housing wealth ($)  
< 1 (reference) 5.1 5.8 4.8
1–100,000 54.9 61.6 62.1
100,001–200,000 14.9 13.4 13.9
> 200,000 25.1 19.2 19.2
Age  
50–51 4.6 14.1 11.3
52 4.3 10.0 8.6
53 6.9 11.5 10.3
54 6.7 9.6 8.7
55 8.2 9.4 9.8
56 8.3 9.1 9.5
57 9.4 9.6 10.3
58 9.4 7.7 8.8
59 9.2 6.7 7.8
60 9.4 7.7 9.2
61 8.3 4.5 5.5
62 4.9 0.3 0.2
63 3.7 n/a n/a
64 2.7 n/a n/a
65 1.6 n/a n/a
66 or older 2.4 n/a n/a
Table 2
Sample Descriptive Statistics
(Percentages except number of men and transitions)
Nonwhite 14.6 16.2 14.4
Education  
less than high school (reference) 22.5 24.4 24.2
high school only 32.5 32.7 33.3
some college 19.5 19.2 19.2
college degree or more 25.6 23.6 23.4
Body Mass Index  
underweight (BMI < 18.5) 0.2 0.2 0.3
normal (18.5 ! BMI < 25) (reference) 27.1 29.6 27.7
overweight (25 ! BMI < 30) 49.6 49.5 50.4
obese (BMI " 30) 23.1 20.7 21.6
Multiple chronic health conditions 26.8 20.1 21.5
Fair or poor self-reported health 12.2 11.9 12.2
Marital status and spouse’s employment  
not married (reference) 15.2 15.9 15.0
married/spouse full-time 37.1 37.9 37.9
married/spouse part-time 14.2 14.9 15.7
married/spouse < part-time 33.5 31.2 31.4
Job tenure    
< 1 year (reference) 6.1 7.7 7.3
1–5 years 15.7 17.2 15.3
5–10 years 15.8 14.6 15.4
10–15 years 12.4 11.4 10.8
15–25 years 20.7 21.7 21.0
> 25 years 29.4 27.4 30.2
Self-employed 20.1 19.6 17.4
Blue-collar occupation 43.1 44.4 44.6
Transitions
1992–1994 (reference) 32.6 100 100
1994–1996 24.0 0 0
1996–1998 17.3 0 0
1998–2000 12.4 0 0
2000–2002 8.5 0 0
2002–2004 5.3 0 0
Source: Health and Retirement Study sample of 3,150 men aged 51 to 61 who were working full-
time in 1992.
Note: Broad-definition retirement (column 3) is movement from full-time/full-year employment to 
either self-reported retirement or the “other” category (employed part-time, unemployed, disabled, 
not in the labor force) in Figure 2. 
RHBs RHBs
Age offered not offered N
50–51 15.6 12.0 443
52 16.2 11.1 314
53 17.7 10.9 361
54 17.6 11.6 302
55 18.3 12.9 296
56 18.1 14.4 286
57 20.0 15.8 302
58 20.3 14.6 243
59 17.4 16.2 211
60 20.3 16.1 243
61 18.0 17.0 141
62 13.6 17.1 8
all ages 17.9 13.4 3150
Table 3
Mean Job Tenure (in Years) at Wave 1,
by Age and Whether Employer Offered RHBs
Source: Authors’ tabulations of the Health and 
Retirement Survey, 1992 (wave 1) sample. See Table 2 
notes for details.










employer-provided but no RHBs (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
employer-provided and RHBs 0.032 0.010 0.001 0.027 0.006 0.000 0.027 0.011 0.012 0.034 0.010 0.001
non-employer 0.035 0.018 0.056 0.030 0.014 0.032 0.049 0.026 0.064 0.039 0.020 0.051
none 0.042 0.018 0.022 -0.002 0.012 0.899 0.047 0.024 0.050 0.041 0.018 0.026
Defined Benefit pension wealth ($)
0 (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
1–100,000 0.010 0.012 0.386 0.018 0.008 0.020 0.012 0.012 0.341 0.008 0.012 0.484
100,001–200,000 0.083 0.019 0.000 0.071 0.014 0.000 0.075 0.020 0.000 0.082 0.019 0.000
> 200,000 0.079 0.019 0.000 0.079 0.015 0.000 0.070 0.020 0.001 0.075 0.019 0.000
Defined Contribution pension accumulation ($)
0 (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
1–100,000 -0.034 0.010 0.000 -0.017 0.006 0.003 -0.038 0.010 0.000 -0.035 0.010 0.000
100,001–200,000 0.004 0.023 0.860 -0.001 0.013 0.916 -0.016 0.023 0.500 0.004 0.023 0.853
> 200,000 0.032 0.023 0.169 0.002 0.014 0.895 0.017 0.026 0.517 0.035 0.024 0.142
Housing wealth ($)
< 1 (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
1–100,000 0.007 0.013 0.560 0.005 0.008 0.519 0.004 0.014 0.773 0.009 0.013 0.482
100,001–200,000 0.012 0.016 0.441 0.008 0.011 0.475 0.018 0.018 0.317 0.018 0.016 0.275
> 200,000 -0.003 0.021 0.886 0.003 0.014 0.808 0.033 0.028 0.227 0.000 0.021 0.996
Non-housing wealth ($)
< 1 (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Left FT employment 
for narrow-definition 
retirement
Left FT employment 
for broad-definition 
retirement
Left FT employment 
for broad-definition 
retirement
Full Full Drop workers self-
employed in wave 1
Drop observations at 
age 65
Table 4
Estimates of the Restricted Model





1–100,000 0.010 0.020 0.599 0.032 0.014 0.022 0.008 0.021 0.725 0.008 0.020 0.693
100,001–200,000 0.055 0.025 0.026 0.070 0.023 0.002 0.062 0.027 0.023 0.054 0.025 0.031
> 200,000 0.048 0.024 0.043 0.071 0.021 0.001 0.046 0.027 0.084 0.042 0.024 0.076
Age
50–51 — — — — — — — — — — — —
52 0.025 0.035 0.467 0.071 0.042 0.090 0.009 0.039 0.822 0.023 0.034 0.490
53 0.075 0.034 0.027 0.074 0.039 0.057 0.092 0.039 0.019 0.074 0.033 0.028
54 0.058 0.034 0.081 0.052 0.036 0.146 0.062 0.039 0.106 0.057 0.033 0.084
55 0.073 0.033 0.028 0.083 0.039 0.033 0.102 0.039 0.009 0.072 0.033 0.027
56 0.030 0.031 0.335 0.052 0.034 0.132 0.044 0.036 0.229 0.029 0.031 0.341
57 0.095 0.034 0.005 0.130 0.044 0.003 0.126 0.040 0.002 0.093 0.033 0.005
58 0.101 0.034 0.003 0.114 0.042 0.006 0.115 0.039 0.003 0.098 0.033 0.003
59 0.169 0.036 0.000 0.193 0.050 0.000 0.183 0.042 0.000 0.165 0.036 0.000
60 0.312 0.038 0.000 0.347 0.058 0.000 0.360 0.043 0.000 0.307 0.038 0.000
61 0.359 0.039 0.000 0.376 0.060 0.000 0.411 0.043 0.000 0.356 0.039 0.000
62 0.325 0.043 0.000 0.343 0.064 0.000 0.375 0.049 0.000 0.321 0.043 0.000
63 0.397 0.045 0.000 0.401 0.068 0.000 0.450 0.049 0.000 0.395 0.045 0.000
64 0.417 0.048 0.000 0.429 0.071 0.000 0.471 0.052 0.000 0.415 0.048 0.000
65 0.399 0.055 0.000 0.350 0.079 0.000 0.446 0.063 0.000 n/a n/a n/a
66 or older 0.369 0.053 0.000 0.349 0.075 0.000 0.376 0.061 0.000 n/a n/a n/a
Nonwhite -0.005 0.012 0.694 -0.011 0.007 0.119 -0.019 0.013 0.127 -0.003 0.012 0.793
Education
less than high school (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
high school only -0.009 0.012 0.464 -0.007 0.007 0.340 -0.013 0.013 0.333 -0.007 0.012 0.577
some college -0.009 0.014 0.515 -0.023 0.008 0.002 -0.005 0.016 0.729 -0.006 0.014 0.677
college degree or more -0.038 0.014 0.007 -0.036 0.008 0.000 -0.046 0.016 0.004 -0.037 0.014 0.009
Body Mass Index
underweight (BMI < 18.5) 0.276 0.124 0.026 0.103 0.093 0.268 0.262 0.135 0.051 0.303 0.129 0.019
normal (18.5 ! BMI < 25) (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
overweight (25 ! BMI < 30) 0.007 0.010 0.459 0.006 0.006 0.367 0.011 0.011 0.325 0.002 0.010 0.860
obese (BMI " 30) 0.026 0.012 0.036 0.013 0.008 0.116 0.024 0.014 0.091 0.022 0.012 0.074
Multiple chronic health conditions 0.029 0.010 0.004 0.013 0.006 0.040 0.032 0.011 0.005 0.027 0.010 0.009
Fair or poor self-reported health 0.055 0.014 0.000 0.033 0.010 0.001 0.063 0.016 0.000 0.061 0.014 0.000
Marital status and spouse’s employment
not married (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
married/spouse full-time -0.039 0.013 0.002 -0.029 0.008 0.000 -0.043 0.014 0.002 -0.042 0.013 0.001
married/spouse part-time -0.051 0.014 0.000 -0.036 0.007 0.000 -0.060 0.015 0.000 -0.054 0.014 0.000
married/spouse < part-time -0.010 0.013 0.450 -0.012 0.008 0.109 -0.018 0.014 0.219 -0.018 0.013 0.173
Job tenure
< 1 year (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
1–5 years -0.022 0.019 0.248 -0.002 0.015 0.869 -0.045 0.020 0.022 -0.025 0.019 0.173
5–10 years -0.048 0.018 0.008 0.006 0.015 0.698 -0.065 0.019 0.001 -0.048 0.018 0.007
10–15 years -0.040 0.019 0.036 0.019 0.017 0.277 -0.056 0.020 0.005 -0.043 0.019 0.020
15–25 years -0.026 0.019 0.161 0.043 0.018 0.016 -0.039 0.021 0.057 -0.035 0.018 0.056
> 25 years -0.019 0.019 0.324 0.047 0.017 0.005 -0.020 0.022 0.359 -0.018 0.019 0.349
Self-employed -0.044 0.012 0.000 -0.059 0.006 0.000 -0.078 0.024 0.001 -0.044 0.012 0.000
Blue-collar occupation 0.014 0.010 0.156 0.012 0.006 0.049 0.013 0.011 0.239 0.015 0.010 0.127
Transitions
1992–1994 (reference) — — — — — — — — — — — —
1994–1996 -0.008 0.012 0.495 -0.001 0.008 0.887 -0.002 0.013 0.887 -0.008 0.012 0.504
1996–1998 -0.029 0.013 0.022 -0.007 0.008 0.388 -0.027 0.015 0.063 -0.031 0.013 0.015
1998–2000 -0.037 0.014 0.008 -0.007 0.009 0.434 -0.037 0.016 0.018 -0.034 0.014 0.013
2000–2002 -0.027 0.016 0.091 0.005 0.011 0.626 -0.015 0.019 0.412 -0.020 0.017 0.235
2002–2004 -0.050 0.018 0.006 -0.014 0.011 0.204 -0.041 0.021 0.052 -0.057 0.019 0.002
Sample size (person-wave observations) 9,657 9,657 7,729 9,274
Number of individuals 3,150 3,150 2,532 3,150
Notes: Estimates come from applying a random effects probit estimator to equation (1), with covariates specified as in equation (2). The dependent 
variable is an indicator equal to 1 if a man moved from full-time/full-year employment in period t to broad-definition retirement (columns 1, 3, and 
4) or to narrow-definition retirement (column 2) in period t+1 (approximately two years after t). Broad-definition retirement is the union of self-
reported retirement and the “other” category in Figure 2. Narrow-definition retirement is self-reported retirement only. The full sample is the 
sample described in Table 2 and Figure 2. Figures in the “dy/dx” column give the estimated average change in the two-year retirement probability 
associated with each specified characteristic, based on the probit estimates. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of 
errors for each worker over time.
dy/dx p-value dy/dx p-value
Age
50–51 -0.087 0.012 -0.021 0.358
52 -0.033 0.324 -0.027 0.117
53 -0.030 0.223 0.035 0.027
54 0.041 0.106 0.019 0.217
55 0.007 0.772 0.027 0.037
56 0.014 0.562 0.010 0.454
57 0.017 0.405 0.008 0.439
58 0.030 0.140 0.018 0.080
59 0.019 0.309 0.013 0.154
60 0.070 0.000 0.019 0.011
61 0.058 0.002 0.016 0.037
62 0.019 0.432 0.004 0.702
63 0.009 0.756 0.025 0.042
64 0.024 0.460 -0.011 0.428
Job tenure
< 1 year 0.064 0.008 0.025 0.067
1–5 years -0.022 0.176 -0.009 0.292
5–10 years -0.005 0.769 0.003 0.718
10–15 years -0.005 0.776 0.009 0.296
15–25 years 0.025 0.066 0.018 0.005
> 25 years 0.035 0.003 0.018 0.001
Transitions
1992–1994 -0.001 0.952 0.011 0.097
1994–1996 0.031 0.019 0.006 0.343
1996–1998 -0.002 0.901 0.011 0.114
1998–2000 0.012 0.475 0.004 0.577
2000–2002 0.048 0.017 0.026 0.003
2002–2004 0.039 0.137 0.015 0.203
Notes: See the notes to Table 4. For each subgroup, dy/dx is the estimated average 
difference between the two-year retirement probability of workers with an offer of 
RHBs and the retirement probability of workers in the same subgroup who had 
EPHI but no RHB offer. Subgroup estimates are obtained by estimating equation 
(1) with covariates specified as in equation (3)—i.e., with rhb fully interacted with 
the other independent variables in the model. Each subgroup estimate is computed 
by evaluating the derivative of retired with respect to rhb for the subgroup at the 
sample mean. (See section VI for details.) Complete model estimates are available 
from the authors.
Estimated Changes in Conditional Retirement Probabilities 
Table 5
Associated with Subgroup Characteristics, Based on the Unrestricted Model
Subgroup or transition
Left FT employment 
for broad-definition 
retirement





Age No RHBs RHBs Rt No RHBs RHBs Rt No RHBs RHBs Rt No RHBs RHBs Rt
50 1000 1000 6 1000 1000 -18 1000 1000 4 1000 1000 -5
51 978 972 6 966 984 -17 994 990 4 990 995 -5
52 956 944 6 932 967 -3 987 979 8 980 990 -14
53 930 912 7 902 940 -3 971 955 8 953 977 17
54 896 870 6 864 905 20 954 930 7 945 953 8
55 866 834 6 841 862 9 941 911 8 936 935 14
56 834 796 5 812 824 8 924 885 6 926 911 4
57 811 768 6 791 795 12 911 866 10 915 896 6
58 777 729 5 761 753 15 885 830 8 891 866 11
59 744 690 5 734 710 13 863 800 11 875 839 12
60 699 640 5 693 656 42 826 751 14 843 795 26
61 624 560 3 638 560 28 750 661 11 781 707 18
62 546 479 1 574 468 3 674 574 7 715 623 -2
63 486 418 -1 516 407 -5 617 510 4 657 567 21
64 419 352 -3 447 342 -1 552 442 1 606 494 -23
65 357 293 -- 388 284 -- 490 378 -- 532 444 --
Table 6
Survivor Functions for Men Aged 50 to 65 and
RHB-associated Retirements (Rt) at Each Age
Dependent variable: Left FT employment for Dependent variable: Left FT employment for 
Note: The “No RHBs” and “RHB” columns show the number of workers without and with RHB offers who remain 
working full-time based on conditional retirement probabilities calculated from the estimates in Tables 4 (panels 1 and 2) 
and 5 and applied to a cohort of 1,000 workers starting at age 50. (The survivor figures are rounded to the nearest whole 
number.) The Rt column shows the number of RHB-associated retirements at each age (negative when RHB-offered 
workers have more retirements than those not offered RHBs). 
UnrestrictedUnrestricted
broad-definition retirement narrow-definition retirement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Restricted Restricted
Figure 1 






















Notes: “EFT” are employed full-time workers. “Retired” in this figure refers self-reported retired 
workers. “Other” refers to men no longer EFT, but not self-reported retired. (The group includes 
those employed part-time, unemployed, disabled, and not in the labor force.) “Attrition” refers to 
those not interviewed in the following wave, for any reason. 
Source: Authors’ tabulations of Health and Retirement Study data. See text for discussion.  
 
3,150 employed full-time (EFT) men
2,313 EFT 225 retired 309 other 303 attrition 1992-1994 transition sample 
N = 2,847
1,671 EFT 226 retired 235 other 181 attrition 
1994-1996 transition sample 
N = 2,132
1,194 EFT 185 retired 166 other 126 attrition 1996-1998 transition sample 
N = 1,545
819 EFT 169 retired 123 other 83 attrition 1998-2000 transition sample 
N = 1,111
510 EFT 161 retired 92 other 56 attrition 2000-2002 transition sample 
N = 763
327 EFT 94 retired 72 other 17 attrition 2002-2004 transition sample 
N = 510
Figure 3 
Survivor Functions for Full-Time Workers With and Without RHB Offers, 
Based on the Restricted Model (left) and the Unrestricted Model (right) 
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